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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Christopher C. Tapp appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
(Docket No. 25295) 1
The state charged Tapp with, and a jury convicted him of, first-degree
murder, rape, and a weapon enhancement for use of a deadly weapon during the
commission of the murder and rape of Angie Dodge in her apartment in Idaho
Falls. State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 33 P.3d 828 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Tapp I").
Prior to trial, Tapp filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police
during various interviews, which the district court granted in part and denied in
part. (#25295 R., Vol. II, pp.198-99.) The Idaho Court of Appeals set forth the
facts underlying the suppression issue as follows:
Early in the morning of June 13, 1996, Angie Dodge was
raped and stabbed to death in her apartment in Idaho Falls. On
January 7, 1997, twenty-year-old Christopher Tapp voluntarily
submitted to police questioning about this crime at the Law
Enforcement Building (LEB) in Idaho Falls. Tapp again voluntarily
went to the LEB for questioning on January 10. After this interview,
Tapp's parents retained private counsel for their son. When Tapp
did not appear at the LEB for another scheduled interview on
January 11, police officers went to his home to find him. They were
informed by Tapp's mother that an attorney had been retained and
that Tapp would appear on January 13, with counsel, to answer
more questions. Approximately one hour later, the Idaho Falls chief
of police arrived at the Tapp home and attempted to convince
Tapp's mother to change her mind about her son's refusal to be
1

The district court took judicial notice of the record and transcripts in Tapp's
underlying criminal case, Bonneville County Case No. CR-1997-97281 (Docket
No. 25295). (R., p.78; Exhibits.)
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interviewed without assistance of counsel. She refused. Rather
than waiting for a voluntary interview on January 13, law
enforcement officials obtained a warrant to arrest Tapp on a charge
of accessory to a felony, Idaho Code§§ 18-205, -206, and he was
arrested on January 11.
After making the arrest, an officer put Tapp in an interview
room and called Tapp's attorney. Before the attorney's arrival, the
officer initiated a discussion with Tapp about the type of information
the police wanted to obtain from him. On January 13, another
attorney joined in Tapp's representation as co-counsel. Thereafter,
Tapp was interviewed, while under arrest and in police custody, on
January 15 and 17. During all interviews at the LEB from January
15 forward, Tapp was separated from his attorneys. The attorneys
were placed in a nearby office in the LEB where they were allowed
to observe the interviews on a closed-circuit television. Tapp's only
contact with his attorneys was during breaks in the interviews. His
attorneys apparently made no objection to this arrangement.
In the first interviews Tapp denied having any knowledge of
the crime, then claimed that Ben Hobbs had confessed to killing
Dodge and had asked Tapp to help him with an alibi. Tapp denied
having ever been at the crime scene. By January 15 and 17,
however, Tapp's story was changing, and he admitted that he had
accompanied Hobbs to Dodge's apartment on the night of the
murder. Tapp told police that Hobbs wanted to confront Dodge
because Hobbs believed that she had convinced Hobbs's wife to
leave him. Tapp claimed that Hobbs and Dodge started fighting
and that Hobbs punched Dodge and then stabbed her twice. Tapp
asserted that he ran from the apartment at that point. He admitted
that he returned later and found Dodge dead and no one else
present. Tapp also implicated a man named Jeremy Sargis in the
crime. Tapp said he believed that the murder weapon belonged to
Sargis, but he initially claimed that Sargis was not in the apartment
that night. Eventually, however, Tapp accused Sargis of helping to
rape and murder Dodge.
On January 15, Tapp and the State entered into a "limited
use immunity" agreement, and on January 17 they entered into a
"cooperation and settlement agreement."
These agreements
(hereinafter referred to collectively as the "immunity agreements")
required Tapp to cooperate with the police investigation of Dodge's
death and to provide the police with truthful information about the
crime. Tapp also agreed to plead guilty to aiding and abetting an
aggravated battery, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-903, -907, and the State
agreed not to file any other charge against Tapp related to Dodge's
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death. The State also promised to recommend at the sentencing
hearing that the district court retain jurisdiction for a limited period
pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4), and to allow withdrawal of the guilty
plea if the judge did not follow the recommendation. The State also
agreed not to use any of Tapp's statements against him except for
impeachment purposes.
As a consequence of the immunity
agreements, the pending charge against Tapp for accessory to
felony was dismissed on January 17 and he was released from
custody.
Tapp was again questioned on January 18 and 29. Before
the January 29 interview began, the prosecutor informed Tapp and
his attorney that the prosecutor considered the immunity
agreements with Tapp to be void because Tapp had not been
truthful in describing the crime. The prosecutor explained that
Tapp's contention that Hobbs and Sargis were the rapists was
contradicted by DNA tests showing that semen found on Dodge's
body and clothing did not come from either of those men (or from
Tapp). Despite this declaration from the prosecutor, Tapp and one
of his attorneys continued with the January 29 interview. On that
date, Tapp was given a polygraph test, during which he asked to be
taken to the apartment where the murder occurred.
Tapp's
attorney agreed that the police could take Tapp to the crime scene
for further questioning, but the attorney declined to accompany
Tapp and the officers. Once at the crime scene, Tapp made
statements implicating himself in the crimes. At the crime scene
and later the same day at the LEB, Tapp admitted that he had held
Dodge's arms and shoulders down throughout the rape and
stabbing. In his new account of the events, Jeremy Sargis was
replaced by a different male whose name Tapp could not
remember. Some details of his story about how Dodge was raped
and details of other events of that night changed during this and
two subsequent interviews.
Tapp was rearrested after the January 29 interview. The
next day, he was again charged with being an accessory to a
felony. Tapp was further interviewed on January 30 and 31. On
February 3, 1997, charges of rape, I.C. § 18-6101(3), (4), and first
degree murder, I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4002, -4003(a), replaced the
accessory charge.
Tapp moved to suppress the statements that he made to
police on the grounds that his right to counsel was violated during
police interviews, that his statements to police were involuntary,
and that the immunity agreements were still binding on the State.
Before this motion was decided, Tapp's original attorneys withdrew
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and other attorneys were appointed to represent him. The district
court denied the suppression motion except as to statements made
on January 11 after Tapp was arrested and before his attorney's
arrival.
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 357-58, 33 P.3d at 831-32 (footnote omitted).
On appeal, Tapp challenged the district court's order denying his motion to
suppress.

(#25295 Appellant's Brief, pp.11-60.)

The Court of Appeals

concluded Tapp's "Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated by police
procedures in [his] case" when counsel were only permitted to watch the
interviews from another room.

Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 362, 33 P.3d at 836.

However, this did not require suppression of all of Tapp's statements. Because
"[t]he parties agree[d] that Tapp was not in custody during the January 7, 10 and
18 interviews ... there was no Miranda violation as to those interrogations," and
suppression was not required. Id. With respect to the remaining interviews, the
Court of Appeals concluded:
As to the January 11 interview, the record shows that, except for
the portion of the interview that was suppressed by the district
court, Tapp's attorney was present with him in the same room
during questioning. Therefore, Tapp has shown no violation of the
right to counsel on January 11. The interviews of January 15, 17,
30, and 31 all occurred while Tapp was incarcerated and formally
charged, and it is undisputed that these were custodial
interrogations during which Tapp was separated from his counsel.
Therefore, all statements Tapp made to police on these dates
should have been suppressed.
The parties disagree as to whether Tapp was "in custody"
during the January 29 questioning, which occurred at the LEB and
at the crime scene. The district court made no express finding of
fact on the issue, ....
It is clear that Tapp w.as not under formal arrest at the time
of his January 29 interviews. However, formal arrest is not a
factual prerequisite to a finding of custody. For Miranda purposes,
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"custody" occurs when a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to
a degree associated with formal arrest. This is an objective test
that is based on the totality of the circumstances; the inquiry is how
a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood
his situation.
The surrounding circumstances establish that Tapp was not
"in custody" when he was interrogated by police on January 29.
Tapp initially appeared voluntarily at the LEB on that date with
counsel and was told at the outset that the prosecutor considered
the immunity agreements to be void. Despite this development,
Tapp did not decline further interviews or invoke his privilege
against self-incrimination. There is no evidence that the police ever
told Tapp that he could not leave or that he had to undergo
interrogation. At no time during questioning was he under arrest or
led to believe that he was under arrest. In fact, an officer at one
point told Tapp that although it was likely he would eventually be
going to prison, he wasn't going to be put in jail that day. Tapp
himself asked to be taken to the crime scene, where the interview
continued and where he ultimately made some of his most selfincriminating statements. His attorney was invited, but declined, to
accompany him. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the
district court did not implicitly find that Tapp was in custody during
the January 29 interviews, and if such a finding had been made, it
would not be supported by the record. We hold that Tapp was not
in custody on January 29, and therefore his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel did not attach and was not violated. Only Tapp's
statements made on January 15, 17, 30, and 31 are suppressible
for Fifth Amendment violations.
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 362-36, 33 P.3d at 836-37 (internal quotations and citations
omitted, emphasis in original).
Tapp also claimed his statements were used in violation of his due
process rights based on his assertion the statements were coerced and
involuntary. Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 63, 33 P.3d at 838. The Court concluded the
statements made during the interviews on January 7, 10, 18, and 29 were not
suppressible under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court reasoned:

5

When Tapp was interviewed, he was twenty years old and
had a high school education. There is no indication that he has an
unusually low IQ or suffers from any cognitive defects. The
interviews occurred on several days over the course of a month's
time. They varied in length, but, with the exception of the January
11 interview, they took place during daylight hours. Tapp does not
argue that he was subjected to interrogations of excessive length or
that he was deprived of food or sleep. Miranda warnings were
given to Tapp before each interview. All of these factors weigh
against a finding of involuntariness.
Nevertheless, Tapp argues that the State used various
interrogation techniques to confuse him and coerce him into saying
whatever the police wanted to hear. First, Tapp claims that he was
induced to confess by unkept promises of leniency. On January
29, an investigating officer told Tapp that another immunity
agreement could be worked out if Tapp gave the name of the
unidentified participant in the crime. However, Tapp never gave the
information - the name of the unidentified party - on which the offer
of leniency was predicated.
Further, this promise was not
conditioned on Tapp admitting to having taken an active part in the
crimes; rather, it was offered despite Tapp's having already
admitted to actively assisting the principal perpetrators. Therefore,
this promise could not have induced Tapp's confession.
Tapp also claims that the police improperly used his religious
beliefs to induce a confession. In particular, he claims that an
officer offered him divine forgiveness through confession. Tapp's
characterization of the conversation is not supported by the record.
Here, although the officer discussed his own ecclesiastical beliefs
and offered to take the confession Tapp had expressed a desire to
make, he prefaced that offer by specifically disclaiming any power
to grant divine absolution. References to religious sentiments are
not coercive per se. Moreover, even if the officer's comments were
deemed an impermissible appeal to religious sentiment, it would
not lead to suppression of any statements because Tapp made no
new admissions after this discussion took place.
Finally, Tapp alleges that the police used provocative
questions to heighten his anxiety and stress and employed
hypothetical questions to encourage speculative responses. Tapp
has not, however, referred us to any authority suggesting that such
interrogation techniques are impermissible. The use of hypothetical
questions is not inherently coercive. The police are allowed to play
on a suspect's ignorance, fears and anxieties so long as they do
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not magnify these emotionally charged matters to the point where a
rational decision becomes impossible.
Having examined the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that the district court properly concluded that Tapp's
disclosures to police were not the product of police coercion. Tapp
has not shown error in the district court's refusal to suppress
statements he gave to police on January 7, 10, 18 and 29.
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 364-65, 33 P.3d at 838-39 (internal quotations and citations
omitted, emphasis in original).
Because the Court of Appeals determined some of Tapp's statements
should have been suppressed, it engaged in a harmless error analysis.

The

Court concluded reversal of Tapp's convictions was not required in light of the
statements Tapp made on January 29, which were properly admitted at trial.
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 365, 33 P.3d at 839. "Because these statements included
explicit and highly incriminating confessions, ... the erroneous admission of
other confessions made on other dates was harmless." Id. at 365-66, 33 P.3d at
839-40. Specifically, the Court noted:
On January 29, while in Dodge's apartment, Tapp admitted that he
helped restrain Dodge when she was being raped and when Hobbs
cut her throat. After Tapp and the officers returned to the LEB on
the same day, Tapp admitted that he held Dodge's arms down
while she was being raped and forced to engage in fellatio. He also
confessed that he was holding Dodge's arms when Hobbs stabbed
her in the chest which, according to Tapp, was the first time she
was stabbed. He claimed to have released her arms and stood up
immediately when that happened, implying no further participation.
However, later in the same interview he admitted that he was also
holding Dodge's arms when the unidentified participant stabbed
her. Thus, in his conversations with police on January 29, Tapp
admitted to having helped restrain Dodge while she was sexually
attacked, while Hobbs inflicted the initial stab wound to the chest,
while the unidentified participant again stabbed her in the chest,
and while Hobbs cut her throat. We are confident beyond a
reasonable doubt that if these detailed confessions made on
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January 29 had been the only statements from Tapp heard by the
jury, the verdict would have been the same.
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 366, 33 P.3d at 840.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Tapp's conviction and sentences on July
20, 2001, and the Idaho Supreme Court denied review on October 29, 2001.
Tapp I, 136 Idaho at 354, 33 P.3d at 828.

Course Of Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings, (Docket No. 35536) 2
Tapp filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, excessive sentence, and
a violation of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because he was not
sentenced by a jury. (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.8-20.) Tapp's ineffective assistance
of counsel claims more specifically alleged trial counsel were ineffective by (1)
advising him to submit to the January 29 interview in light of the state's position
that the immunity agreement was void; (2) leaving him "alone with the officers on
January 29;" (3) failing to accompany him to the crime scene on January 29; (4)
failing to "investigate and/or present evidence of [Tapp's) diminished mental
capacity" at the suppression hearing to support his claim that his "confessions
were coerced

and

involuntary;" (5) failing to "present evidence of the

circumstances of the January 29, 1997, interrogation" to demonstrate he was, in
fact, in custody on that date; (6) failing to "investigate [Tapp's] diminished mental

2

The district court also took judicial notice of the record from Tapp's original
post-conviction case, Bonneville County Case No. CV-2002-6009 (Docket No.
35536) and at least implicitly granted Tapp's motion to take judicial notice of the
transcript from the evidentiary hearing in that case, which Tapp submitted as an
exhibit in support of his successive petition. (R., pp.78, 99, 123-124 (considering
testimony); Exhibits.)
8

capacity and present evidence of it prior to going to trial, and during the penalty
phase" so the district court "could have considered whether or not [he] was
mentally capable to stand trial" and for the district court to consider Tapp's
"lessened culpability in light of [his] low I.Q.;" (7) failing to call Tapp as a witness
at trial; and (8) failing to file a Rule 35 motion. (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.10-11.)
Tapp filed a motion for appointment of counsel (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.2327), which the district court granted (#35536 R., Vol. I, p.32).

The state

thereafter filed an answer (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.43-44), and motion for summary
dismissal with a supporting memorandum (#35536 R., Vol. I, pp.46-56).

The

district court conducted a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal
after which it entered a written order granting the state's motion as to all claims
except Tapp's claims that counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and
raise issues regarding Tapp's competency; (2) not calling Tapp as a witness
despite Tapp's alleged request that he do so; and (3) failing to present evidence
of Tapp's "mental condition" at sentencing. (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.135-61.) The
state filed a motion to reconsider the district court's decision to not summarily
dismiss all of his claims, contending Tapp failed to raise a genuine issue of
material fact entitling him to a hearing on the three claims the court did not
summarily dismiss because Tapp failed to (1) establish trial counsel did not
investigate his competency or show that he was incompetent to stand trial; (2)
specifically articulate what his trial testimony would have been and therefore
failed to establish prejudice in relation to this claim; and (3) establish his mental
condition would have been a significant factor at sentencing. (#35536 R., Vol. II,
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pp.163-80.) The court conducted a hearing on the state's motion to reconsider
and permitted Tapp to supplement the record with additional evidence. (#35536
R., Vol. II, p.181.) Tapp subsequently submitted a written objection to the state's
motion to reconsider (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.183-86), and an affidavit (Affidavit of
Christopher Tapp (hereinafter "Second Tapp Aff.") (Exhibit)).

In his second

affidavit, Tapp averred trial counsel (1) never told him he had a right to testify; (2)
told him he was not going to call him as a witness at the preliminary hearing
because he did not want the state to be able to use that testimony to prepare for
trial; (3) did not prepare him to testify at trial; (4) did not "explain to the jury or [the
court] at sentencing that [he] ha[s] a diagnosed mental illness and that influenced
[him] in [his] cooperation with the investigators;" and (5) did not give him the
"opportunity to testify."

(Second Tapp. Aff., pp.2-3.)

The state filed written

responses to both Tapp's objection and his second affidavit. (#35536 R., Vol. II,
pp.191-96, 200-07).
After reconsidering its prior order denying the state's motion for summary
dismissal of Tapp's claims in relation to his competency, his desire to testify, and
the presentation of evidence at sentencing, and after reviewing relevant portions
of the underlying criminal case, the district court concluded summary dismissal
was appropriate. (#35536 R., Vol. II, pp.209-228.)
On appeal, Tapp asserted, for the first time, "that his claim that counsel
was ineffective for failing to call him as a witness should have been analyzed by
the district court, not just as an instance of ineffective assistance of counsel, but
also as a direct violation of his right to testify." Tapp v. State, 2010 Unpublished
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Opinion No. 412 at p.12 (Idaho App. March 31, 2010) ("Tapp II"). The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument because "Tapp not only pied the issue as an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, but presented the issue to the district
court as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim."

1sL.

The Court also rejected

Tapp's alternative argument that he met his burden of showing ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):
Tapp alleges that he should have been called to testify so
that the jury could consider his testimony in evaluating the weight to
be given the other evidence presented at trial, most particularly, the
videotape of the confession on January 29. Tapp's claim focuses
on his contention that his testimony would show "how Sgt.
Fuhriman and Detective Finn threatened me, and coerced me into
a confession in this crime, and explain the events concerning this
crime." Tapp also refers to the addendum setting forth his version
of events occurring on January 29. In addition, in a supplemental
affidavit, Tapp alleged that "I knew I had to tell the jury that the
tapes were not true."

During trial, Tapp's counsel attempted to expose coercive
interrogation techniques on the part of the police.
Sergeant
Fuhriman was cross-examined on the use of coercive tactics and
accused of coercing Tapp into his confession. Fuhriman admitted
to using "deceptive" questioning techniques. Tapp's counsel spent
considerable time cross-examining officers to suggest that they
took advantage of and coached Tapp into his statements and
confession. Thus, much of the proffered evidence was presented
to the jury and the implications Tapp wished to raise were made
apparent to the jury.
While this Court stated: "The state's case was based almost
entirely upon Tapp's confessions to having helped other men rape
and murder Dodge; no physical evidence linked Tapp to the crime."
Tapp, 136 Idaho at 358, 33 P.3d at 832, the State provided other
evidence that tended to corroborate the confession. The State
called forensic experts to testify regarding how the crime was
committed based on the physical evidence. The crux of the State's
case was that Tapp's confession provided accurate forensic details
which the officers had not divulged to him prior to his confession.
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The officers that interviewed Tapp testified about consistencies
between Tapp's confession and the forensic evidence that the
public did not know. J.S. testified that a month after the murder she
overheard Hobbs tell a nervous Tapp to keep calm or he "was
going to blow the alibi." D.O. testified that a few days after the
murder she overheard Tapp say that he stabbed Dodge because
she owed money for crank, he held her down while she was raped
and killed, Hobbs slit her throat, and Tapp got blood on his shirt.
J.B. lived with Tapp during the time of the murder and testified
Tapp left the night of the murder wearing his favorite shirt and
returned at 3:00 or 4:00 am without it and J.B. did not see the shirt
again. A.O. testified that the morning after the murder she saw
Hobbs down at the river with his shirt slung over his shoulder and
crying because Dodge had been killed. Other evidence showed
that this was before Dodge's murder had become public
information.
The district court determined that, since the record was
devoid of the rationale for trial counsel not calling Tapp to testify, for
purposes of the motion for summary dismissal, the court would
assume that the failure to call Tapp was against his wishes and
therefore deficient performance. The court, thus, proceeded to the
prejudice analysis. The district court found that Tapp had failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding prejudice because
Tapp did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
outcome would be different if Tapp had testified in light of his actual
statements and participation in the police questioning as presented
on the videotapes. The court concluded:
In viewing the videotapes, the jury was able to make a
determination whether Tapp's statements were freely and
voluntarily given, or the subject of coercion and undue
pressure. Based upon the Court's review of the videotapes,
the Court finds no merit to the latter argument. In the Court's
opinion, any testimony by Tapp at the time of trial that his
prior statements for some reason should not be give [sic]
credence would be given little or no weight and as such, it is
not reasonably probable that any such testimony would
change the outcome of the trial. To the extent counsel erred
by not allowing Tapp to testify, such was harmless error.
(Footnote omitted.)
We too conclude that on this record, Tapp failed to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the second
prong of the Strickland analysis, prejudice, that but for the
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attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would
have been different. The district court correctly granted summary
dismissal of Tapp's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to call Tapp to testify at trial.
Tapp 11 at pp. 13-15 (footnote omitted).
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal of Tapp's
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Tapp to testify, and affirmed
the denial of relief on other claims raised on appeal, it remanded the case with
respect to Tapp's claim that counsel was ineffective for "failing to present all of
the circumstances of the January 29 events in order to demonstrate that Tapp
was, in fact, in custody at the time of the statements he made on that date," and
his claim that counsel was ineffective at the suppression hearing for failing to
present evidence of "his diminished capacity that" he believed "would have led to
a finding that the confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed."
Tapp II at pp.5-12. The basis for the remand was for the district court to consider
additional facts alleged by Tapp that were not considered "in granting summary
dismissal" since the district court erroneously concluded Tapp was precluded
from relitigating the issues based on the Court's determinations on direct appeal
regarding custody and the voluntariness of Tapp's confession. Tapp II at pp.7-8,
11-12.
Post-Conviction Proceedings Following Remand (Docket No. 40197)
"On remand, the state again filed a motion for summary dismissal seeking
dismissal" on Tapp's claim that counsel was ineffective during the suppression
hearing. Tapp v. State, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 761 at pp.6-7 (Idaho App.
Nov. 21, 2013) ('Tapp Ill"). Specifically, the state asserted a "confession is not
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subject to suppression for involuntariness absent some evidence of police
coercion" and "even assuming all of Tapp's newly submitted diminished mental
capacity evidence to be true, the video recordings of Tapp's numerous
interrogations showed that his alleged mental infirmity was not of such
significance as to conclude, in the totality of the circumstances, that the January
29 confession was involuntary." Tapp Ill at p.7. Tapp responded that summary
dismissal was improper because the Court of Appeals remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.

kl

The district court disagreed, determining that the Court

of Appeals' "opinion did not mandate an evidentiary hearing" and "granted the
State's motion for summary dismissal."

kl

Tapp again challenged the summary dismissal on appeal and the Court of
Appeals "conclude[d] that the district court was correct" in deciding that an
evidentiary hearing was not mandated by law of the case. Tapp Ill at pp.7-8.
Turning to the merits of the summary dismissal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
after finding "Tapp's challenges to the district court's judgment granting summary
dismissal [were] without merit." Tapp Ill at pp.10-15.

Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 41056)
On March 4, 2009, while his initial post-conviction appeal was pending,
Tapp filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief contending he was
denied his right to testify. (R., pp.4-7.) The state filed a motion to dismiss based
on the successive petition bar in I. C. § 19-4908 and based on the statute of
limitations in I.C. § 19-4902(a). (R., p.12.) Tapp filed a motion to stay pending
resolution of his original post-conviction appeal; although the district court did not
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rule on the motion, the case was effectively stayed until September 2012 when
the district court entered a notice of proposed dismissal for failure to prosecute.
(R., pp.10, 18.) Tapp filed an objection to the notice along with affidavits from

several attorneys who represented Tapp during his original post-conviction case.
(R., pp.20-23, 33-35, 38-40, 42-43.) Tapp also filed a response to the state's

motion to dismiss, asserting (1) the successive petition was appropriate given the
alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel for failing to raise a
substantive claim that Tapp was denied the right to testify (as opposed to an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim), and (2) the successive petition was
timely because it was filed 14 months before the conclusion of the original postconviction appeal. (R., pp.51-54.) Tapp also asserted his successive petition
claim has merit. (R., pp.54-56.) In conjunction with this response to the state's
motion to dismiss, Tapp filed an affidavit detailing his desire to testify at trial and
that he did not intend to waive any substantive claim regarding his right to testify.
(R., pp.59-61.)

The district court denied the state's motion for summary dismissal, finding
(1) Tapp "presented sufficient/prima facie evidence to the effect that counsel in
his original petition were ineffective in failing to raise" a substantive claim
regarding Tapp's right to testify, and (2) "the second petition was brought within a
reasonable time." (R., pp.84-85.) The court then stated:
While the State in its motion may have intended to assert that the
evidence establishes a voluntary waiver of the right to testify and/or
that the failure to testify was harmless error, it is the Court's opinion
that the State's motion was not sufficiently specific to put Tapp on
notice, nor does the Court believe that those issues have been fully
addressed. Therefore, the Court on its own motion now raises the
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issue of whether this matter should be summarily dismissed under
a Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)] analysis[.]
(R., p.86.)

The court gave Tapp 30 days to respond to its notice and set

subsequent deadlines for the state's response and Tapp's reply. (R., p.86.)
Tapp filed a response to the court's notice, contending it was the state's
burden to show the error was harmless and that the state could not do so. (R.,
pp.88-96.)

In his response, Tapp relied on his testimony from the evidentiary

hearing held on his original petition regarding his desire to testify and what he
would have testified to if he had been called as a witness at trial. (R., pp.90-92.)
Tapp then attempted to expand his claim, stating (1) he would "provide th[e]
Court with his affidavit stating that he would also testified [sic) in support of the
alibi defense which was presented at the criminal trial"; (2) he "could have
supplemented his trial testimony with that of June Elizabeth Bloxhan-Nielsen"
who testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing; and (3) "[i]n addition to
presenting his own relevant evidence about why the confession was false, [he]
could have presented an expert to explain how police interrogation techniques
can cause false confessions."

(R., pp.92-94.)

As promised in his response,

Tapp filed another affidavit averring that had he "been called to testify in [his]
criminal trial [he] could have testified to everything [he] testified to at [his]
evidentiary hearing in CV-2002-6009" and he "would have testified in support of
[his] alibi defense at trial." (R., pp.101-102.)
The state filed a response, noting trial counsel testified at the evidentiary
hearing that Tapp was "adamantly opposed to testifying" at trial.

(R., p.106.)

The state also asserted Tapp's failure to testify, if error, was harmless.
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(R.,

pp.107-108.)
Tapp filed a reply claiming, in part, that the court could not consider trial
counsel's testimony from the evidentiary hearing because it was "not the basis
for dismissal which the Court gave notice" and the state's "suggestion" that trial
counsel's testimony showed Tapp was not deprived of his right to testify was "not
in response to the Court's Order ... and is logically irrelevant to the precise issue
before the Court." (R., p.135.) Tapp further claimed that, even if trial counsel's
testimony was considered, it only served to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that entitled him to an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.136.)
The court summarily dismissed Tapp's claim. (R., pp.122-133.) The court
rejected Tapp's assertion that the court could not address whether he voluntarily
waived his right to testify or trial counsel's prior testimony on that point and found
that "Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify at the time of trial." (R., pp.123129.)

"For the sake of expediency," the court also "consider[ed] the issue of

whether the failure to testify constitutes harmless error, even assuming Tapp did
not voluntarily waive his right to testify." (R., p.129.) The court concluded the
error was harmless. (R., pp.130-133.) With respect to Tapp's assertions that he
could have testified in support of his alibi, the court found Tapp should have
raised that claim in his original petition but nevertheless addressed the proffered
alibi testimony and found it "would not have altered the jury's conclusion to his
guilt." (R., pp.131-132.)
The court entered judgment dismissing Tapp's successive petition and
Tapp filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.144, 149-151.)
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ISSUES

Tapp states the issues on appeal as:
A.
Did the district court err because it dismissed the case on a
ground, i.e., that Mr. Tapp's right to testify had not been violated,
different than that raised in its notice of intent to dismiss?

B.
Assuming arguendo that the issue was raised by the court,
did the court err by creating a new legal presumption that Mr. Tapp
waived his right to testify by his silence at trial and then resolving
the factual issue against him during the summary disposition
proceedings by applying that presumption?
C.
Did the court err because it dismissed a portion of the case
on a ground, i.e., that Mr. Tapp was barred from raising the alibi
testimony issue because he could have raised it in his first petition,
different than that raised in its notice of intent to dismiss?
D.
Assuming arguendo that issue was raised by the court, did
the court err by finding the issue should have been raised in the
first petition?
E.
Did the court err in concluding that any deprivation of the
right to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
(Appellant's Opening Brief ("Appellant's Brief'), p.6.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Tapp failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing
the only claim raised in his successive post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Tapp Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
His Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Tapp contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his

successive post-conviction petition. Tapp advances three primary arguments in
support of his claim:

(1) the court failed to provide adequate notice of the

grounds for dismissal; (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact entitling him
to an evidentiary hearing on whether he voluntarily waived his right to testify; and
(3) the district court erred in conducting its harmless error analysis.

(See

generally Appellant's Brief, pp.6-40.) Review of the relevant law and the entire
record shows Tapp has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his
successive post-conviction petition.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on
the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and
will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).
The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony are
matters within the discretion of the trial court. Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,
702, 274 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
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The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Tapp's Claim Of Lack Of Notice Is Without Merit
After rejecting the state's request for summary dismissal based on the

successive petition bar and the statute of limitations, the court stated:
While the State in its motion may have intended to assert that the
evidence establishes a voluntary waiver of the right to testify and/or
that the failure to testify was harmless error, it is the Court's opinion
that the State's motion was not sufficiently specific to put Tapp on
notice, nor does the Court believe that those issues have been
fully addressed.
(R., p.86 (emphasis added).) "Therefore, the Court on its own motion now raises

the issue of whether this matter should be summarily dismissed under a
Chapman[ 3] analysis[.]" (R., p.86.) The court then quoted the following excerpt
from Rossignol:
However, if the failure of a defendant to testify is considered in the
context of deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right, then
pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17
L.ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or
she was deprived of the right to testify, and the state must then
convince the reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the
deprivation did not contribute to the defendant's conviction-that it
was harmless error.
(R., p.86 (quoting Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5) (emphasis

added).)

3

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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Although Tapp did not address the first part of the constitutional issue in
his response to the court's notice, i.e., whether he was deprived of his right to
testify (R., pp.88-96), the state, in its response, did. Specifically, the state quoted
the following testimony by Tapp's trial counsel when he testified at the
evidentiary hearing in Tapp's original post-conviction case:
[Tapp] expressed on a number of occasions that he was fearful of
taking the stand because he'd been manipulated so successfully.
Those were not his words. But he'd become confused a number of
times during the interview process and he was very concerned
about becoming confused on the witness stand and he was
adamantly opposed to testifying. Now, that's relative particularly to
trial. Again, I don't have specific recollection about the preliminary
hearing and discussing with [Tapp] testifying at the evidentiary
hearing.
(R., p.106 (quoting #40197 E.H. Tr., p.171, L.5 - p.172, L.10 4) (emphasis added
by state in its response).)
In his reply, Tapp complained about the state addressing the issue of
whether he voluntarily waived his right, contending that issue was not included
within the court's notice. (R., p.135.) Regardless, Tapp addressed the merits of
the state's argument. (R., p.136.)
In its written decision denying relief, the district court stated its prior notice
"raised the issues of (1) whether Tapp voluntarily waived his right to testify, and if
not (2) was the failure to testify harmless error." (R., p.123.) The court then
proceeded to address both issues. (R., pp.123-141.)

4

The state's response cites pages 162-163 of the evidentiary hearing transcript;
however, the transcript prepared for appeal, which is cited herein, has the quoted
testimony at pages 171-172.
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On appeal, Tapp disagrees with the district court's interpretation of its own
notice and argues, "the court never raised the issue of whether [he] voluntarily
waived his right to testify." (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Tapp further contends that,
as a result, he was deprived of the right to notice of dismissal of his claim on this
basis and "an opportunity to respond" and asks this Court to vacate this "portion"
of the district court's decision and "remand for further proceedings." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.8, 10.) Tapp's notice argument should be rejected.
Although Tapp assumed the district court's notice did not include the
threshold issue of whether Tapp was denied his right to testify, the notice can
easily be construed otherwise, and it is clear from the district court's decision that
it believed the issue was open for consideration.

That Tapp interpreted the

language differently does not mean he was not given adequate notice.

Cf.

DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602, 200 P.3d 1148, 1151 (2009) (cannot
challenge the adequacy of notice for the first time on appeal). In any event, the
purpose of providing notice of the grounds for dismissal under I.C. § 19-4906(b)
is to give the petitioner "an opportunity to respond and to establish a material fact
issue" in order to avoid summary dismissal. Flores v. State, 128 Idaho 476, 478,
915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).

Since Tapp actually

responded to the waiver issue, even arguing, in part, that the state's reliance on
trial counsel's testimony created a genuine issue of material fact, it is difficult to
understand how he was meaningfully deprived of notice, much less an
opportunity to respond.

It is also unclear what purpose would be served by

remand in light of the fact that Tapp responded to the issue. This Court should,
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therefore, decline Tapp's request to "vacate the order and remand for further
proceedings" on this basis.

D.

There Was No Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Tapp To An
Evidentiary Hearing
"The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie

case by presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his or her
claims." DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150 (citation omitted). As
noted by the district court in its notice, it is the defendant's burden to show he
was deprived of his right to testify. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5.
The district court, relying on federal circuit court precedent, determined
Tapp failed to meet his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact "that
trial counsel refused to allow him to testify."

(R., pp.123-129.)

The court

reasoned:
... Tapp relies upon his bare assertion that trial counsel refused to
allow him to testify. Rather than corroborating this assertion, it is
the testimony of trial counsel that he discussed with Tapp whether
Tapp should testify, with Tapp making the decision that he would
not testify. There is nothing in the record reflecting that Tapp made
any objection to the trial judge to the effect that he wanted to testify
or was not satisfied with trial counsel and the decision not to call
Tapp as a witness. Based on the foregoing case law, Tapp's
silence at the time of trial at the very least creates a presumption
that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to testify. Tapp's
belated testimony alone in post-conviction proceedings that he
wanted to testify is insufficient to rebut that presumption. Based on
the foregoing, the Court finds that Tapp voluntarily waived his right
to testify at the time of trial.
(R., p.129.)
On appeal, Tapp claims the court erred in making this determination
because, he argues, the court could not resolve the "controverted issue" without
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an evidentiary hearing.

(Appellant's Brief, p.14.)

Tapp further contends that,

"even if the court were allowed to weigh conflicting evidence, it still reached the
wrong conclusion." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Tapp's arguments fail.
In Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008),
the Court acknowledged that "an applicant's uncontroverted factual allegations ..
are deemed to be true" but stated that "because the trial court rather than a jury
will be the trier of fact in the event of an evidentiary hearing, summary disposition
is permissible, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences to be drawn from
the facts, for the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between
those inferences." In other words, "the judge in a post-conviction action is not
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for
summary disposition but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to
be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." J.s:L.
Tapp contends Hayes "does not apply here" because the facts in this case
are controverted. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) The state submits, however, that it
was appropriate for the court to find Tapp voluntarily waived his rights because
the record contradicts his claim. As explained in McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,
570,

225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010) (quotations and citation omitted), "Allegations

contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when ( 1) they
are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not
justify relief as a matter of law."5 In the original post-conviction proceedings, trial

5

The state recognizes that the district court engaged in a different analysis of
this issue; however, this Court may affirm on the correct theory. See, ~ .
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999).
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counsel testified that Tapp was "adamantly opposed to testifying" at trial.
(#40197 Tr., p.172, Ls.3-7.) Tapp did not dispute this assertion at the time and
his claim that he wanted to testify but counsel refused to let him are inconsistent
with his prior testimony that when he asked if it would be "proper" for him to
testify at the suppression hearing, he was "shot down" and did not question that
decision because he "trusted [counsel's] judgment." (#400197 Tr., p.140, Ls.1122.) Tapp also testified that he did not tell trial counsel about the "issues" he
later raised in relation to the January 29 interview because he "believed in" trial
counsel, "believed in everything [trial counsel] was doing," thought counsel had
his "best interest in mind," and "believed that [counsel] was doing everything he
could to help." (#40197 Tr., p.144, Ls.5-14.) It strains logic to believe that Tapp
was any less willing to follow counsel's advice with respect to testifying at trial
and counsel's testimony that Tapp, in fact, did not want to testify at trial because
he was afraid he would get manipulated on the stand is entirely consistent with
Tapp's position that that is exactly what happened when he was interviewed by
law enforcement.
Tapp's current attempt to undermine this testimony by calling it "nonresponsive" to the question asked and irrelevant to the suppression issue being
discussed at the prior hearing does not mean it should be disregarded for
purposes of determining whether the record contradicts Tapp's claim that he
wanted to testify but his trial counsel prevented him from doing so. Further, as
Tapp acknowledges, the district court resolved credibility issues against Tapp at
the prior hearing. (Appellant's Brief, p.34 n.11.) Under the unique circumstances
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of this case, where there has already been relevant testimony considered by the
district court, and credibility determinations made, no purpose would be served
by holding another evidentiary hearing for Tapp to refute counsel's testimony that
Tapp did not want to testify. 6

E.

Tapp Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That
Any Deprivation Of Tapp's Right To Testify Was Harmless
If deprivation of the right to testify did not contribute to the defendant's

conviction, the error is harmless. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704, 274 P.3d at 5.
The district court determined that, "even assuming Tapp did not voluntarily waive
his right to testify," the error was harmless because Tapp's proffered testimony
"would not have altered the jury's conclusion as to his guilt." (R., pp.129-132.)
Tapp raises several complaints about the district court's harmless error
analysis. First, Tapp contends the court erred in "refus[ing] to consider any of
[his] allegations regarding his alibi defense."

(Appellant's Brief, p.17.)

This

assertion lacks merit.
In his successive petition, Tapp alleged, in relevant part, that "trial counsel
refused to permit [him] to testify at the criminal trial even though [he] specifically
asked to testify." (R., p.5.) Tapp filed a supporting affidavit in which he reiterated
his desire to testify and averred:

6

The state acknowledges that, in Rossignol, the Court of Appeals stated, "a
defendant may not be found to have waived his or her right to testify at trial
unless the defendant was aware that he or she not only had such right, but also
the ultimate right to decide whether to testify regardless of counsel's advice."
152 Idaho at 709, 24 P.3d at 10. This holding does not preclude the district
court's finding in this case because the record supports the conclusion that Tapp
was aware he had the right and that he was the one who did not wish to exercise
it.
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8. I did not voluntarily agree to not testify due to [trial counsel's]
advice. I did not know that I had the right to testify even if [counsel]
didn't want me to testify and believed it was his decision to make.
9. If I had known that I had the final say on the question, I
would have testified because I knew I had to tell the jury that
things I said on the tapes were not true and that I had been
manipulated into saying those things.
(R., pp.59-60 (emphasis added).)
It was not until Tapp filed his response to the court's notice that he claimed
he also could have offered testimony in support of his alibi defense. (R., p.92.)
The district court took issue with Tapp effectively amending his claim in this
manner. The court stated, in part: "[A]llegations of an alibi defense will not be
considered.

The failure to raise the subject alibi allegations as ineffective

assistance of counsel and/or a constitutional violation in the first Petition preclude
the consideration of alibi allegations in this successive petition."

(R., p.131.)

Although the foregoing comments were made in the context of an analysis citing
I.C. § 19-2719 (R., p.131), which the state concedes applies only to capital

cases, the court's "objection" to Tapp's attempt to alter his claim by adding
proposed alibi testimony to his original assertion that he wanted to testify so he
could "tell the jury that things [he] said on the tapes were not true and that [he]
had been manipulated into saying those things" was well-founded.

The entire

basis for Tapp's successive petition was that the claim from his original petition,
that he wanted to testify but counsel prevented him from doing so, was raised
only as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not a substantive right to
testify claim. That claim has always been centered on Tapp's desire to explain
the circumstances surrounding his confession, not to support his alibi defense.
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(#35536, 11/5/2007 Tr., pp.32-33; #40197, E.H. Tr., pp.30-156.) The court would
have been justified in declining to consider Tapp's new assertions under the
circumstances.

See Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, _ , 314 P.3d 587, 591

(2013) ("Fields cannot cure these factual shortcomings in his petition with
supplemental affidavits filed months after his petition."); cf. Kelly, 149 Idaho at
523, 236 P.3d at 1283 ("It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of
action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal.") (quotations and
citations omitted).
That said, Tapp is incorrect in his assertion that the court ultimately
"refused to consider any of [his] allegations regarding his alibi defense."
(Appellant's Brief, p.17.) Although the district court initially said the allegations
would "not be considered," it later stated: "even if Tapp testified at trial regarding
an alibi, it is the conclusion of this Court when considering the record, there is no
reasonable doubt that had Tapp testified regarding an alleged alibi, such
testimony would not have altered the jury's conclusion as to his guilt."

(R.,

p.132.) This conclusion was correct.
Tapp presented an alibi defense at trial through other witnesses. (#25295
Tr., Vol. 11, pp.1416-1455.) The jury, by its verdicts, clearly rejected that defense.
There is no reasoned basis for concluding that the jury would have accepted that
defense if Tapp would have taken the stand and confirmed what other witnesses
already said. Even if Tapp had testified and agreed with his alibi witnesses, the
jury still would have found him guilty.

28

Tapp next complains that the district court, in conducting its harmless error
analysis, did not "distinguish[ ] between the evidence actually admitted at trial
and the evidence which would be admissible at a new trial" in light of the Court of
Appeals' finding of error in Tapp I.

(Appellant's Brief, p.27.)

Tapp cites no

authority for the proposition that a harmless error analysis under Chapman is so
limited and caselaw suggests that the reviewing court considers the evidence
that was presented in deciding whether a deprivation of the right to testify was
harmless. See, gJL, Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 709, 274 P.3d at 10; cf. State v.
Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 2010) (evaluation of
sufficiency of the evidence includes all evidence admitted, even if admission was
erroneous). Tapp's suggestion that the court could not consider evidence of his
statements that the Court of Appeals determined should have been suppressed
also fails to take into consideration that, had he testified in the manner he claims
he should have been "allowed" to testify, those statements would have been
admissible as impeachment. See Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 201 (1998)
(recognizing that state may introduce "statements elicited from a defendant in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966), for the purpose of impeachment, so long as the jury is instructed that
such evidence may not be considered for the purpose of determining guilt")
(citations omitted).
Finally, Tapp contends the court erred in deciding the error was harmless
based on his view of the flaws of certain evidence presented at trial and his
assertion that he "could have supplemented his trial testimony with that of June
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Elizabeth Bloxhan-Nielsen" who testified at the post-conviction evidentiary
hearing and, "[i]n addition to presenting his own relevant evidence about why
[his] confession was false, [he] could have presented an expert to explain how
police interrogation techniques can cause false confessions." (Appellant's Brief,
pp.23-40.) Tapp's own view of the testimony of a few witnesses does not show
his failure to testify was not harmless. A harmless error analysis in this context
considers all of the evidence presented at trial in relation to what the defendant
would have contributed had he testified at trial.
With respect to Tapp's desire to testify to explain how his confession was
coerced, the issue of coercion was explored at trial through the crossexamination of Detective Fuhriman. See Tapp II at p.13. Moreover, the jury was
able to view the videotape of the confession to assess, on its own, the validity of
Tapp's confession.

Having Tapp testify would not have changed the jury's

assessment of this evidence; if anything, it would have opened Tapp up to
potentially damaging cross-examination and exposed him to the very concerns
trial counsel testified Tapp had about testifying in the first instance. Compare
Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 709, 27 4 P.3d at 10 (noting as part of its harmless error
analysis in relation to deprivation of defendant's right to testify that defendant's
"presence on the stand would have exposed him to cross-examination about the
thousands of pornographic images and the incest stories on his computer"). Nor
is it appropriate for Tapp to claim the error was not harmless because if he had
testified he would have also presented other witnesses to corroborate his
testimony.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.36, 38.)
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Such testimony could have been

presented regardless of whether Tapp testified and any claim that trial counsel
should have presented that evidence, alone or in conjunction with Tapp's
testimony, was not alleged in Tapp's successive petition and could not have
been properly alleged because it is a claim Tapp could have raised in his original
petition. See I. C. § 19-4908.
For the reasons stated, any testimony from Tapp explaining why he
confessed and claiming, as did other witnesses, that he had an alibi would not
have changed the outcome.

Thus, even assuming Tapp was deprived of his

right to testify, the district court correctly concluded the error was harmless.
Summary dismissal of Tapp's successive petition was, therefore, appropriate.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
summary dismissal of Tapp's successive petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 30 th day of January 2014.
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